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A QUESTION AT THE START
OF THE TALK
Introducing the symposium’s communi-
cations panel, moderator Derek Yach asked
us: Who is likely to be the leader in a pan-
demic in the United States? Dr. Yach’s seri-
ous question was met by a wave of laughter
from the audience; perhaps the absence of an
obvious leader led to the laughter. I certainly
didn’t have an American name to offer. But
here is the over-arching tech spec for such a
leader: Before a pandemic begins, this leader
will help the public grapple with, rather than
avoid, the agonizing dilemmas involved in
pandemic planning.
The Western public, when it pays
attention to pre-pandemic news, often hears
from two main categories of experts. Some
experts stress the low odds of a severe pan-
demic (partly because we only really know
about one pandemic as bad as the Spanish
flu). Other experts stress the potential hor-
rific magnitude of the next pandemic (part-
ly because H5N1 avian influenza that
jumps from poultry to people has a case
fatality rate that is terrifying).
The public also hears from experts who
give the impression (without exactly saying
so) that a pandemic is imminent. Other
experts more overtly state their reasons why
a pandemic is unlikely any time soon.
It takes experts with unusual commu-
nication skills or instincts to convey both
halves of both of those extremes: “This
virus might become much milder if it
becomes easily transmissible, or it could
retain an unprecedented virulence.” “This
could start tomorrow, or not for decades.”
It is very hard to help people hold this
two-by-two table of ideas in mind at the
same time — soon/distant, mild/cata-
strophic. On the one hand: Drop every-
thing, and get ready for a Category 5
storm! On the other hand: Let’s continue
to beef up All Hazards planning and think
about re-building public health capacity.
But to prepare rationally, we have to
balance both of those emotionally and cog-
nitively conflicting thoughts. So, future
pandemic leaders will have to help us
begin to hold the catastrophic possibility in
our minds at the same time as the possibil-
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balance and integrate this in advance, they
will have a better chance at leading us if
the pandemic comes — and a chance at
keeping our respect if it never comes. That
is what I would advise leaders to do —
help people balance the conflicting and
unknowable “what ifs,” and help people
bear the anxiety that this will cause.
THE WHO OUTBREAK
COMMUNICATION GUIDELINES
A year after the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreaks
ended, the two of us [1] on this sympo-
sium’s communication panel helped the
World Health Organization develop a draft
framework for “outbreak communication
guidelines.”After input and feedback from
ministries of health and WHO officials
from all over the world, the final guide-
lines were published early in 2005 — this
lovely brochure [2]. It contains five main
recommendations for good outbreak com-
munication. I will mention three of the
guidelines to raise questions about ethical
aspects of pandemic preparedness: trust,
transparency, and involving the public.
Trust, transparency, and candor are
aspirationalgoals—wedonotexpectcom-
plete let-it-all-hang-out transparency from
officials, and people rarely put blind trust in
officials. Officials do wish that the public
would trust them — often without showing
much trust in the public in return and with-
out being very transparent. I am going to
address the less familiar side of this equa-
tion: agencies’ and governments’ lack of
trust in their publics, and the clouded com-
munication which this distrust generates.
TRUST, TRANSPARENCY, AND
TAMIFLU STOCKPILING
Trust in the public, and transparent
communication, have been sorely lacking
with regard to Tamiflu stockpiling — an
issue generating a wide range of medical
and ethical opinions, nearly all of them
against personal stockpiling.
Many official and expert statements
about personal Tamiflu stockpiling show
various types of distrust of the public:
• Apparent distrust of the public’s ability
to accept official decisions.
• Fearofinvolvingthepublicindebateabout
government-mandated priority groups.
• And, all too often, overt contempt and
disdain for the public’s intelligence and
competence.
Here are some excerpts from WHO’s
internal pandemic contingency plan [3].
You probably could have guessed that
WHO has an internal pandemic plan —
but outsiders didn’t know about it until it
was leaked to a science reporter named
Declan Butler at the journal Nature [4].
Someone at WHO thought that an organi-
zation citing trust and transparency as two
of its five outbreak communication guide-
lines should share its internal contingency
plan. Nature published the news in mid-
August 2005. Excerpts from the plan:
WHOHealthandMedicalServicesContingency
PlanForanInfluenzaPandemic,May30,2005
The purpose of this contingency plan is to
ensure preparedness […] in the event of an
influenza pandemic which will affect WHO
staff and their dependents.
The WHO preparedness plan should be used
as a model for other agencies and bodies of
the UN system. However, it is not intended as
specific guidance for diplomatic missions or
other public and private sector organizations.
The WHO pandemic preparedness plan is
required for the following reasons:
• The WHO must maintain essential WHO
functions, even in the face of a crisis.
• The WHO has a duty of care to its staff and
their dependents.
Stockpiling Oseltamivir
If a pandemic is declared it is very likely that
all stocks of medicine useful against influen-
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exhausted. Therefore WHO offices must be
prepared and stockpile some Oseltamivir.
[…]WHOofficeseachshouldhaveabasicstock-
pileideallyallowingfora5-daycourseofTamiflu
for approximately 30 percent of all their staff and
their dependents. […] Because antivirals will
become valuable commodities during a pandem-
ic, they should be stored in a secure place.
This advice is quite similar to the
openly available guidance on the U.S.
State Department website:
Based upon limited data, the CDC has suggested
that the anti-viral medication Oseltamivir (brand
name:Tamiflu)maybeeffectiveinpreventingor
treating avian influenza. Using this input, the
Department of State has decided to pre-position
thedrugTamifluatitsEmbassiesandConsulates
worldwide, for eligible U.S. Government
employees and their families serving abroad.[5]
Got it? The United States is openly
positioning Tamiflu for its overseas
embassy employees and dependents;
WHO is privately recommending that
WHO and other United Nations offices
consider stocking enough Tamiflu for up
to 30 percent of staff and dependents. But
the U.S. government and WHO strongly
recommend against private stockpiling.
International SOS, a company that
provides private medical and security ser-
vices in far-flung places like arctic oil rigs
and remote mines, started working on pan-
demic preparedness long before most
other companies (and many countries)
were even interested. In a June 2005
update, the company stated:
International SOS has been unable to locate
any internationally issued recommendations
regarding corporate stockpiling of
Oseltamivir [6].
So, it came up with its own guidance
for the companies, schools, and individuals
that subscribe to its medical and security
services. Its guidance, released in early
August 2005, turned out to be fairly similar
to the WHO internal pandemic plan that
was reported a week or so later. During the
time International SOS had been develop-
ing its recommendations, the U.S. govern-
ment kept saying it was only planning to
stockpile 2.3 million treatment courses of
Tamiflu. But around the same time that
International SOS announced its recom-
mendations, the U.S. announced its inten-
tion to buy 20 million treatment courses.
Responding to the International SOS
announcement, here is what a respectful
U.S. official said, invoking the national
interest but not showing any disdain or
contempt for the company’s plan. The
Atlanta Journal Constitution reported:
A senior science advisor at HHS, who helped
write and revise the U.S. pandemic plan, said
the government is concerned that corporate
purchases of Tamiflu could threaten the
nation’s response to a flu pandemic.
Our ability to purchase drugs nationally
depends on having that drug available. If
companies purchase it, that will potentially
decrease what is available [7].
The quoted HHS official was Ben
Schwartz. Ben and I have discussed the
stockpiling issue at HHS meetings on pan-
demic communication planning. We agree
about the importance of a national stock-
pile. We disagreed at times about raising
public alarm and about how to involve the
public early in planning efforts. But as
with his other arguments, Ben’s reasons
for arguing against corporate and individ-
ual stockpiling were direct and honest,
compared with many of the arguments
against stockpiling that follow.
The question of whether governments
should control the Tamiflu supply or
whether private entities should do so is a
respectable, debatable question with ethi-
cal and practical pros and cons on both
sides. As the expression goes, “These are
matters about which good people can dis-
agree.” Most official pronouncements
against private stockpiling, unfortunately,
are more like the next few examples.
In our paper, “The Dilemma of Personal
Tamiflu Stockpiling”[8], Peter Sandman and
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behalf of a national stockpile. But we mainly
highlight several categories of specious argu-
ments against personal stockpiles, arguments
often based on distrust of the public’s ability
to reason, follow directions, learn new infor-
mation, or refrain from freaking out.
Two of our four “You’re incompetent”
arguments:
• You’re likely to take your Tamiflu when
youdon’thavetheflu:“Theyhear‘birdflu’
on the radio, and they’ll take their Tamiflu
that day,” a Kaiser Permanente infectious
disease expert told the New York Times.
• You might forget where you put your
Tamiflu.“Personalstockpilesmaygetlost
— people may not track where they store
the Oseltamivir, once again making it
unavailable when needed.” (Various state
health department guidelines regarding
patient requests for Tamiflu [9].)
Two of our eight “It’s futile” arguments
• A pandemic isn’t happening yet. “We’re
trying to explain to parents that avian flu is
really not a concern at this point for their
children,” a Maryland pediatrician told
Bloomberg News in December 2005,
explainingherrefusaltoprescribeTamiflu.
• What if the pandemic comes after your
Tamiflu has expired? “Stockpiled drugs
might pass their expiration date before a
pandemic starts,” the New JerseyTamiflu
prescribing guidelines point out.[10]
One of our six “More harm than good”
arguments
• Having Tamiflu may give people false
confidence. It may therefore deter them
from other useful precautions, such as
frequent hand washing.
Most people making these bad argu-
ments do not even acknowledge the ratio-
nal basis for wanting one’s own Tamiflu.
They make that horn of the dilemma just
disappear. To revisit the question at the
start of this paper: Who will lead during a
pandemic? Probably not officials and
experts who consider most members of the
public to be fools.
It would be much better for officials
to be candid and acknowledge the truth:
“Look, of course it’s best for you if you
have your own Tamiflu. But it’s best for
the country if we decide who gets it.”
That would be debatable, but not insult-
ingandnotdishonest.Anditwouldberespect-
ful if the government would throw open the
debate about how to use its stockpile.
On the day of the Yale symposium, a
communication officer from an overseas
regional WHO office sent me a Reuters
article with the headline: “Worried about
bird flu? [sic] Wash your hands —
Common sense can help people protect
themselves against pandemic” [11].
The article started with three “com-
mon sense measures” against a pandemic:
• Number one is hand washing
• Number two, do not try to buy your own
personal supplies of Tamiflu
• And number three, stay home if you do
get sick.
Then the article included a long list of
prominent experts giving technically true
but disrespectful reasons why people
shouldn’t stockpile Tamiflu, including:
• While Tamiflu might help cope with an
outbreak of H5N1, it is not going to
offer outright protection.
• If you were to take it as a preventative,
you’d have to take it for probably weeks,
a pill a day.
• The average person is not going to know
when, precisely, to begin taking the
drug. Many infections look like flu.
• If you have Tamiflu at home and you
take it for a cold or give it for a respira-
tory virus that is not influenza, we will
be unable to use these drugs when we
encounter a lethal strain of flu.
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cial wrote a note: “So maybe we should
explainHOWTO USE ITWISELY, instead
of recommending that people not get it!”
Compare the examples above with
New Zealand’s official, respectful statement
about personal Tamiflu stockpiling [12]:
“[Question] I’m worried about bird flu and an
influenza pandemic. Is Tamiflu available,
should I wish to add it to my first aid kit?
[Answer] This is something you will need to
discuss with your doctor. Tamiflu is a pre-
scription-only medicine in New Zealand and
is not subsidised by the Government.
Whether it is prescribed by a GP to a patient
or not, at the patient’s request, is at the dis-
cretion of the GP.
With a prescription,Tamiflu can be purchased
at community pharmacies, but some pharma-
cies may have to order in stock.
It is worth noting that any community pre-
scriptions for Tamiflu will not come from the
Government’s national stockpile.”
Now, is that so hard? Apparently it is,
for many officials.
INVOLVING THE PUBLIC
The lopsided emphasis on vaccines
and antivirals leaves the affected — and
unaffected — publics out of the planning.
Again, from the WHO internal plan:
If a new pandemic virus strain emerges it will
be critical to identify the first cases, using the
virus to rapidly develop an effective vaccine.
It would be a number of months before a vac-
cine would be available. It should be noted
that any new pandemic vaccine will initially
be in short supply. Demand will far outstrip
availability.
Availability — for whom?
Virus to develop a vaccine — virus
from whom?
Now that is an ethical issue you don’t
hear about much. Western officials push so
hard for samples from dead or dying H5N1
patients in Vietnam or Indonesia, and now
Turkey. What is the main thing they will
need the samples for, if human-to-human
transmission begins? What are they going
to do with those virus samples? “To rapidly
develop an effective vaccine.” For whom?
Mostly for the First World, where vaccine
production capacity lives. This is rarely if
ever mentioned when Western experts and
commentators rail at the poor countries that
are not sharing virus samples.
All statements about shortages of vac-
cine suggest that non-medical prepared-
ness and local preparedness — planning
for how to maintain essential community
services during a pandemic — should be
an extremely high priority for most of the
world. But it is hard to imagine poor coun-
tries diverting their scarce resources
toward a seemingly distant threat, which
may even attenuate to the point of causing
barely a pandemic ripple.
AtthetimeoftheYalesymposium,there
had not been much official emphasis on non-
medical preparedness even in the U.S. That
has changed since the release of a revised
U.S. pandemic plan as well as the gradually
increasing involvement of the business com-
munity, civil society, and the growing online
communitiesofcitizensworkingtohelpeach
other raise awareness in schools, local gov-
ernments, hospitals, and elsewhere.
There is still almost no emphasis on
non-medical pandemic preparedness in the
developing world. In the ever-increasing
number of countries trying to cope with
bird flu outbreaks in poultry, the main
urgent task is trying to stomp them out and
teach both affected and unaffected poultry
handlers how to protect themselves and
their flocks.
I am going to quote from Peter
Sandman’s October 2005 article, “The Flu
Pandemic Preparedness Snowball” [13], to
argue some of the problems with the lop-
sided emphasis on vaccines and antivirals.
• The focus on the pharmaceutical fix is
excessively optimistic. It is keeping peo-
ple from focusing enough on worst-case
scenarios.
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excessively medical. It is keeping people
from focusing enough on non-medical
preparedness.
• The focus on the pharmaceutical fix is
excessively governmental. It is keeping
people from focusing enough on what
civil society, the private sector, and indi-
viduals can do.
• The focus on the pharmaceutical fix is
excessively national. It is keeping peo-
ple from focusing enough on local pre-
paredness.
• The focus on the pharmaceutical fix is
excessively First World. It is keeping
people from focusing enough on ways to
helpAfrica,Asia, LatinAmerica, and the
Middle East prepare for a pandemic.
How does this relate to risk communi-
cation and pandemic preparedness? The
price we are paying is that the emphasis on
vaccines and antivirals leaves the public
imagining themselves in a passive posi-
tion, waiting for the cavalry to ride in with
a syringe. This misperception is perpetuat-
ed by officials who think there is nothing
for the public to do and, even worse, that
the public is incompetent.
But citizens all over the developed
world are coming up with ideas for public
involvement in pandemic preparedness.
(Check out the Flu Wiki [14] for the most
remarkable and heartening example of
this.) And some of their ideas have impli-
cations for the developing world as well.
I will leave you with two recommen-
dations for involving the public now, in
advance of a pandemic. The first one does-
n’t raise any ethical issues that I can think
of, but it is such an available, cost-effective
preparedness measure that I can’t resist.
CHANGE PUBLIC WASHROOM
FAUCETS AND DOORKNOBS!
One of the main non-pharmaceutical
pandemic preparedness efforts is communi-
cation about hand washing. Same old, same
old, just like your mother always told you
— but there is some real evidence behind it.
So, how can you get people’s atten-
tion about hand washing, and at the same
time reduce disease transmission starting
right now? By making a visible (and rela-
tively small financial) commitment on the
job: Change the faucets and doorknobs on
public washroom doors. Enable people to
turn off the water with their elbow, and
escape from the washroom the same way
— without re-contaminating their hands.
The model comes from the medical
world, but it is not “medical” — picture
the surgical suite, with its scrub sink and
doors. This does not need a billion dollar
budget, or changes in liability laws, or
intellectual property rights negotiations
with companies. Any workplace can
decide to do this on its own. Parents can
put pressure on the schools. Local officials
can lobby for restaurants and other public
places to make the change. HHS, CDC,
and WHO headquarters should go first:
Think pandemic preparedness hand-wash-
ing photo-op!
INVOLVE THE PUBLIC REALLY
EARLY — BRAINSTORM ABOUT
VOLUNTEERS DURING
A PANDEMIC
I’m going to end with my favorite
trick question, because it incorporates the
public, transparency, and candor — and
some degree of trust.
Everyone reading this already knows
there will be hardly any vaccine early on
in a pandemic, right?
Okay. Who will not need vaccine at
all, early on in a pandemic?
Picture it: What happens early on in a
pandemic? Lots of people get sick. And
then what happens? Most of them get bet-
ter. And then what? Presumably, they are
immune — at least for that wave of the
pandemic (but no guarantees). And they
can do high-risk jobs — like delivering
food to home-bound sick people or
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ing for a fellow worker if they have cross-
trained for the job.And they can volunteer.
The best time to help people under-
stand that they will likely be immune (for
at least awhile) after surviving the Great
Pandemic of 2___ is now, before it hap-
pens. People may be too anxious or dis-
trustful to absorb that information quickly
during the pandemic. Imagine officials
trying to tell them, “Hey, you’re all bet-
ter? Come work in the hospital laundry.”
Yeah, right. Better to talk about this in
advance.
There are ethical issues involved with
telling people they may be immune. What
if you are wrong? What if what they had
wasn’t the actual flu, but a “flu-like ill-
ness?” What if there are no lab tests avail-
able to assure them it was really the flu?
But what if they are really needed, and
really valuable, because they are probably
immune? Communicate and share the
dilemma. Ask people for their ideas and
their concerns. Figure it out now.
This suggestion — planning in
advance for a Flu Survivors Corps —
always gets people’s heads shaking or
nodding, sometimes simultaneously. This
wonderful suggestion is actually in the
WHO Checklist For Influenza Pandemic
Preparedness Planning:
Consider how recovered cases, who are pre-
sumably immune to the new virus, can be
identified by occupation (for example, health-
care workers or workers in designated essen-
tial services), in order to facilitate the devel-
opment of a resource of workers presumed to
be immune [15].
Now, before the next pandemic virus
emerges, there are endless opportunities to
help the public come to grips with the terri-
fying, perplexing prospect of an event that
might be like a global tsunami or like the
tiniest of ripples, and which might start
tomorrow or not happen for decades.
Officials will have a better shot at leading
duringapandemic—andinspiringpeople’s
resilience, maturity, imagination, and altru-
ism — by communicating candidly now.
Askthepublictobecomeinvolved,andstart
tonotice(Iwon’tsay“starttotrust”)thatthe
public—mostpeople,atleast—willadjust
to the scary news, and rise to the occasion.
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